关键词:

控制权, 公共服务质量, 责任规避, 信息不对称

Abstract:

In scenarios where public services need to be jointly provided by multiple members, the liability sharing post will affect the distribution of control rights which is determined ex ante by the member with dominant status, thereby affecting all members’ working efforts and the final service quality. By constructing a game model where members jointly provide public service with endogenous control right and liability sharing, we find that an equilibrium with excessive concentration and insufficient service quality may occur by the interaction of “shifting effect” of liability and moral hazard. Further-more, misinterpretation of this equilibrium may induce incorrect policy advices, thereby falling into a trap of “either inactivate when centralized or disordered when decentralized”. As expected liability increases, an inefficient equilibrium with more control right held by the dominant member may temporarily occur, but the equilibrium with sufficient delegation and service quality would be attained after expected liability reaches a threshold. In the perspective of liability sharing, this paper may help us explain some phenomena such as insufficient decentralization of local governments in recent administration reform and the role assignment for a team member.

Key words:

control right, public service quality, liability shift, information asymmetry