Abstract:

This paper takes public health emergencies as exogenous shocks, uses quarterly data of China A-share listed companies from 2017 to 2021 as a sample, and studies the impact of the company's anti-takeover intensity on corporate resilience from the perspective of the establishment of the company's internal charter. The results show that the greater the number of anti–takeover clauses set up in the company's articles of association, the worse the company's resistance and resilience, and the worse its operating performance. Mechanism tests show that the anti–takeover clause is mainly set to reduce corporate resilience by exacerbating the first type of principal-agent costs of the company in crisis scenarios; while the second type of agency costs did not play a role. Heterogeneous analysis finds that the impact of anti-takeover clauses on corporate resilience is more obvious in samples of non–state–owned enterprises with low levels of external supervision, severe epidemic impacts in cities where they are located, and non–state-owned enterprises.

Key words: enterprise resilience, anti–takeover clause, principal–agent problem