中国经济问题 ›› 2025›› Issue (02): 100-.

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反向混改的治理效应:基于两类代理成本视角

  

  • 出版日期:2025-03-20 发布日期:2025-05-27

The Governance Effect of Reverse Mixed-ownership Reform in PrivateListed Companies: A Perspective from Two Types of Agency Problems

  • Online:2025-03-20 Published:2025-05-27

摘要:

文章利用IPO时初始产权性质为民营的上市公司数据考察反向混改程度对两类代理问题的影响结果表明反向混改能够显著降低第二类代理成本但对第一类代理成本 没有明显降低作用甚至有较弱证据表明反向混改会提高第一类代理成本异质性检验表明当公司外部治理和所在地区制度环境较差及不存在政治关联时反向混改才对第二类代理成本具有显著抑制作用此外上述作用主要来自非金融类机构持股这一研究提供了国有资本介入对民营企业代理问题影响的经验证据从而有助于了解反向混改的治理效应

关键词:

反向混改, 治理效应, 代理成本, 民营企业

Abstract:

Using data from A-share nonfinancial listed companies that were privately controlled at the time of IPO, this paper explores the impact of "reverse mixed reform" on two types of agency problems in private enterprises. The results show that state-owned capital can significantly reduce type II agency costs, but the authors find no evidence supporting the negative effect of state-owned capital on type I agency costs. There is weak evidence suggesting that “reverse mixed-owner- ship reform" will aggravate type I agency problems. The results of heterogeneity tests show that the negative effect of "re- verse mixed-ownership reform" on type II agency costs only exists when the external governance and regional institutional environment are poor, and that the effect is not significant in politically connected enterprises. Additionally, the effect of state-owned capital on agency costs mainly comes from the shareholding of non-financial institutions. This study provides empirical evidence on the effect of state-owned capital intervention on two types of agency problems in private enterprises, helping to understand the governance effect of “reverse mixed–ownership reform".

Key words:

reverse mixed-ownership reform, governance effect, agency cost, private companies

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