中国经济问题 ›› 2025›› Issue (01): 105-.

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反收购条款增强了企业的危机应对能力吗———基于企业韧性的视角

  

  • 出版日期:2025-01-20 发布日期:2025-03-20

  • Online:2025-01-20 Published:2025-03-20

摘要:

本文以突发公共卫生事件为外生冲击,采用2017—2021年中国A股上市企业季度数据为样本,从公司内部章程设立的视角,研究公司反收购强度对企业韧性的影响。结果显示,公司章程中设置的反收购条款数量越多,企业的抵抗力和恢复力越差,经营绩效也越差。机制检验表明,反收购条款的设置主要是通过加剧危机情景下企业的第一类委托代理成本降低企业韧性;而第二类代理成本并未发挥作用。异质性分析发现,反收购条款对企业韧性的影响在外部监督水平较低、所在城市冲击较为严重和非国有企业样本中更为明显。

关键词: 企业韧性, 反收购条款, 委托代理问题

Abstract:

This paper takes public health emergencies as exogenous shocks, uses quarterly data of China A-share listed companies from 2017 to 2021 as a sample, and studies the impact of the company's anti-takeover intensity on corporate resilience from the perspective of the establishment of the company's internal charter. The results show that the greater the number of antitakeover clauses set up in the company's articles of association, the worse the company's resistance and resilience, and the worse its operating performance. Mechanism tests show that the antitakeover clause is mainly set to reduce corporate resilience by exacerbating the first type of principal-agent costs of the company in crisis scenarios; while the second type of agency costs did not play a role. Heterogeneous analysis finds that the impact of anti-takeover clauses on corporate resilience is more obvious in samples of nonstateowned enterprises with low levels of external supervision, severe epidemic impacts in cities where they are located, and nonstate-owned enterprises.

Key words: enterprise resilience, anti–takeover clause, principal–agent problem